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Humanism after posthumanism: or qualitative psychology
after the “posts”
Svend Brinkmann
Aalborg University, Department of Communication & Psychology, Aalborg, Denmark
ABSTRACT
Almost 25 years ago, psychologist and qualitative methodologist
Steinar Kvale conjectured that psychology might become obso-
lete or redundant in a postmodern age due to the modernist
legacies of this science. This, of course, has not materialized, but
the question of redundancy reemerges today in new philosophi-
cal guises related to the rise of posthumanist philosophy and
what has come to be known as postqualitative research. In this
article, I aim to (1) introduce the posthuman and postqualitative
critique of conventional qualitative research with an eye to its
relevance for psychology, (2) introduce a distinction between
ontological and advocacy issues concerning the post qualitative
critique in order to (3) propose the idea that qualitative psychol-
ogists can accept much of the ontological theorizing developed
by posthuman and postqualitative scholars, and yet advocate a
humanist agenda for both scientific and ethical reasons.
Historically, this was attempted by pragmatists such as James
and Dewey. In short, the goal of the article is to sketch the
contours of a qualitative psychology after the postqualitative
critique, amounting to a form of humanism after posthumanism.
KEYWORDS
Advocacy; humanism;
ontology; postqualitative
research; posthumanism;
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Introduction
It is well-known that qualitative inquiry has long been challenged by the
what-works movement and the whole quest for quantitative evidence as the
gold standard of scientific practice. Recently, however, qualitative inquiry has
been challenged from within by what has come to be known as “postquali-
tative research” (St. Pierre 2011) and a related “posthuman” critique of key
qualitative terms such as experience, voice, subjectivity, and investigative and
analytical practices such as interviewing and coding. The critics claim these
terms and practices are related to an anthropocentric project that privileges
the experiencing and acting self, which we ought to abandon for both ethical
and ontological reasons. Critics often find inspiration in the posthuman and
new materialist philosophies of thinkers such as Karen Barad (2007), Donna
Haraway (1991), and Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze & Guattari 1987), among many
others (including, not least, the whole oeuvre of Michel Foucault).
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Although this discussion has so far been occurring in the periphery of
qualitative psychology, it seems particularly important for psychology, given
the fact that this discipline is connected in different ways to a humanist
agenda and a scientific study of the experiencing individual. Almost 25 years
ago, psychologist and qualitative methodologist Steinar Kvale (1992) conjec-
tured that a modernist psychology might become obsolete or redundant in a
postmodern age, and it appears that this question of redundancy emerges
again in new philosophical guises today. Given this background, I aim in this
article to (1) introduce the posthuman and postqualitative critique of (what
postqualitative scholars call) conventional qualitative research with an eye to
its relevance for psychology, (2) introduce a distinction between ontological
and advocacy issues (inspired by Charles Taylor) concerning the postquali-
tative critique in order to (3) propose the idea that we can accept much of the
ontological theorizing developed by posthuman and postqualitative scholars
and yet advocate a humanist agenda for both scientific and ethical reasons.
Historically, this was attempted by pragmatists such as William James and
John Dewey. In short, the goal of the article is to defend the idea of a
qualitative psychology after the postqualitative critique, amounting to a
form of humanism after posthumanism. I begin, however, with some
remarks about the historical appearance of qualitative research, both in and
outside of psychology, in order to better understand what is meant by the
more recent postqualitative movement.
The appearance of qualitative research in psychology
Not so long ago, I became interested in tracing the history of the term
“qualitative” as it relates to psychology. With two of my colleagues, I wrote
a chapter on what we called histories of qualitative research (in the plural).
We needed the plural form because there is not agreement concerning how
to define qualitative inquiry as such, and many different legitimate stories
about its development exist (Brinkmann, Jacobsen & Kristiansen 2014). One
of the histories that should be recounted is the simple conceptual history of
qualitative research, having to do with the word itself. It turns out that talk of
“qualitative research” is much more recent than one could think. The term
“qualitative” in itself is not new, of course, and it is well-known that already
the medieval philosophers of scholasticism made a distinction between qualia
(the qualities of things) and quanta (the quantities), which was later accen-
tuated with the empiricist philosophy of John Locke in the 17th century
(pp. 18–20). Locke famously separated primary qualities from secondary
qualities, the former being seen as independent of observers (e.g., extension,
number and solidity), while the latter were conceived as subjective effects in
observers in the form of experienced colors, tastes and smells. Secondary
qualities were thus confined to the subjective mind around the time that new
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natural scientists such as Galileo and Newton demonstrated that “objective
reality” is nothing but matter in motion. Galileo said that the book of nature
is written in the language of mathematics, and thereby implied a metaphysics
of quantities as the primary ontological reality (see also Michell 2003 on the
history of what he calls the quantitative imperative).
Modern science was in many ways built upon this dichotomy of the
subjective and the objective, which relegated human experience, and all the
sounds, sights, smells, and moral and aesthetic qualities that we live with, to
the realm of the subjective. Although David Hartley was the first to use the
word “psychology” in English in 1748 (when he developed an associationist
theory of the mind), a somewhat modern psychological way of thinking had
already entered the picture with Locke and other early empiricists such as
David Hume, whose Treatise from 1739 proclaimed in its subtitle to “intro-
duce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects” (Hume
1978). Newton had developed his mechanical physics for the “outer”
extended world, and Hume thought we needed a corresponding physics of
the mind. In this regard, and given the pervasive subjective-objective dichot-
omy, Alan Costall (2004) has critically described psychology as a mistake
waiting to happen: “When physical science has promoted its methodology (of
atomism, mechanism, and quantification) to an exclusive ontology, psychol-
ogy (so conceived) was a pretty obvious mistake just waiting to happen—an
essentially derivative science modeled on physics, yet having as its subject the
very realm that physics rendered utterly obscure” (p. 184).
Needless to say, however, not all scholars after Locke and Hume were
happy with the division of the world into “objective” primary qualities (that
can be studied scientifically) and “subjective” secondary qualities. There is a
great difference, Goethe argued in 1810 in his Theory of Colors, between
studying colors in terms of Newtonian optics, and in terms of human
experience, for example, and although the latter cannot reasonably be
reduced to the former, it does not mean that it is any less important or
amenable to systematic scientific inquiry. As an example of a field of human
experience, Goethe argued that our understanding of colors had suffered
greatly from being understood in terms of mechanical optics (Robinson 2002,
p. 10). Giorgi and Giorgi have interpreted Goethe’s theory of colors as an
early example of qualitative research in the form of phenomenology (Giorgi
& Giorgi 2008).
Concerning the use of the term “qualitative research” specifically, Wolcott
(2009) has reminded us that “prior to the past three or four decades, not
much had been written about field methods” (p. 80), adding, “as best I recall,
the phrase ‘qualitative research’ was rarely (never?) heard in the 1960s. Of
what had been written earlier, outside their respective academic disciplines,
the same few references and the same few illustrative studies were cited
almost to the exclusion of all others” (p. 80). Certainly, Chicago school
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sociologists such as Everett Hughes, Robert Park, Herbert Blumer, and
Howard Becker wrote about field methods, but usually in connection with
their results and not through the common denominator “qualitative
research.” Wolcott (who had a background in social anthropology) refer-
enced Malinowski’s introduction to his 1922 classic Argonauts of the Western
Pacific and William F. Whyte’s 1943 Street Corner Society as methodologi-
cally inspiring, both of which were also first and foremost ethnographies, and
only secondarily methodologies treatises. Prior to around 1970, researchers
would look to such classics for inspiration rather than to specific methodo-
logical handbooks on “qualitative research,” and they would not yet self-
identify as qualitative researchers.
Wolcott’s memories seem to be corroborated by a search in contemporary
scientific databases (what follows reworks a section from Brinkmann et al.
2014): A general search in all databases of the Web of Knowledge, Science
Citation Index Expanded (which contains articles that date back to 1899 from
all scientific disciplines) reveals that the term “qualitative” was used from
1900 but only in the natural sciences such as chemistry. Even today, quali-
tative analysis remains an important sub-discipline in chemistry (working
with the analysis and classification of chemical compounds) alongside the
quantitative subdisciplines of this science. The first article that appears in a
broad search is from 1900 and bears the title: “On the qualitative separation
of nickel from cobalt by the action of ammonium hydroxide on the ferri-
cyandies” by Browning and Hartwell. If one excludes the natural and tech-
nical sciences, then the term “qualitative” appears in only a few early
psychological papers, for example, “A qualitative analysis of tickling—Its
relation to cutaneous and organic sensation,” published in 1908, and “Some
qualitative aspects of bitonal complexes” from 1921, both appearing in the
American Journal of Psychology. These texts belong to the psychology of
perception, and come quite close to physiology (or “psychophysiology” as it
was then called).
The term “qualitative” in the early 20th century was thus quite closely
connected to natural science disciplines such as chemistry, physiology, and to
some extent the psychology of perception, and it appeared much later in the
broader areas of social science. According to Karpatschof (2010), who has
studied the emergence of qualitative methods within the social sciences, the
term is hardly used until 1970, which represents a kind of historical take-off
point, after which there is an exponential growth in the discourse of quali-
tative research and methods. This has continued to the present day, and we
have in recent decades witnessed a real boom of qualitative research in the
human and social sciences, which is not just seen in the output of research
publications that employ qualitative methods, but especially in the numerous
methodology books that are published every year. This also applies to the
discipline of psychology. For years, after the other disciplines had begun to
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talk about “qualitative research,” psychologists still had to publish their qua-
litative work in journals belonging to neighboring fields such as education or
sociology, but beginning in the last decade journals such as Qualitative
Research in Psychology (established in 2004) and Qualitative Psychology
(from 2013) have emerged, along with handbooks (one of which has even
been published by the American Psychological Association [APA]), research
centers, and the formation of a qualitative section within Division 5 of the APA
(of course, the qualitative methods section within the British Psychological
Society is much older). Prior to the 1980s, one literally finds no hits for
“qualitative research” in psychology journals (Wertz 2014), but this has now
changed altogether, although much “mainstream psychology” and its “flagship
journals” (especially in the United States) still consider qualitative research as
scientifically inferior. We should not ignore the significant differences around
the world concerning the acceptance of qualitative psychology.
Although the term was not really used in psychology before around 1980,
and even if qualitative psychologists were marginalized for decades (and
continue to be so in some parts of the world), it is often forgotten that the
science of psychology was constructed on the basis of (what we now call)
qualitative studies of the human mind (Harré 2004). Many psychology
students learn that Wilhelm Wundt established the first psychological labora-
tory in Leipzig in 1879, and some are told that he developed a
Völkerpsychologie—a study of the mind in its historical and cultural mani-
festations. Rarely, however, are students taught that Wundt’s work amounted
to a kind of qualitative research, even if he did not use this word himself.
The case is similar with many “founding fathers” in psychology, who in
fact based their studies on (what we now call) qualitative inquiry, but without
this being mentioned in most textbooks on psychology and its history. When
we wrote the histories of qualitative research in psychology (Brinkmann et al.
2014), we referred to this as the “repressed history” of qualitative research. It
has likely been seen as embarrassing to text-book writers to include such
figures as Freud and Piaget among qualitative researchers, since qualitative
research practices have not (until recently) figured among the respectable
methods of the science of psychology. Not just Wundt’s cultural psychology,
but also James’s study of religious experience, Freud’s investigations of
dreams and his clinical method more broadly, Gestalt psychologists’ research
on perception, Piaget’s interviews with children, Bartlett’s studies of remem-
bering, and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body (and the list could
go on) represent foundational qualitative studies in psychology. Many of
these figures are routinely addressed in psychological textbooks, but their
qualitative research methods are almost always neglected or repressed
(Brinkmann et al. 2014).
Interpreting the increasing acceptance and use of qualitative research in
psychology is a complex matter. On the one hand, it might signify a simple
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH IN PSYCHOLOGY 113
realization among psychologists that their discipline has “always already”
been qualitative. It seems impossible to understand the nature of human
thinking, feeling, and acting without qualitative description and interpreta-
tion. As Harré argued in the inaugural issue of this journal, the qualitative
methods in psychology do in this regard “meet the demands of the metho-
dology of the natural sciences more truly than do the methods of mainstream
quantitative methodology” (Harré 2004, p. 13). On the other hand, we might
also look to the socio-historical transformations that have taken place over
the past decades, and which Bauman (2000) has summarized as the arrival of
“liquid modernity.” The postmodern or liquid modern times involve a turn
away from stable, bureaucratic structures in society and toward more pre-
carious and changing social forms. We may speculate that qualitative
research gains in importance after 1970 with the emergence of a new
dynamic, multiperspectival, and emergent social complexity that cannot
easily be captured with the use of quantitative methods. I will return to
this historicist reading below when I discuss the rise of post qualitative
research.
The postqualitative critique
The account given above involves the argument that psychology has been
reluctant to embrace the notion of qualitative research, which is ironic, given
the idea that much original psychological theory has been based on exactly
that. However, now that psychology is finally beginning to arrive at the
qualitative—both in practice and through terminology—some qualitative
scholars already seems to be moving on in the direction of “postqualitative
research.” There is now an increasing postqualitative critique of what post-
scholars summarize as “conventional qualitative research” (see, e.g.,
Aghasaleh & St. Pierre 2014). The critique amounts to a political, ethical,
ontological, and methodological questioning of the assumptions and prac-
tices of qualitative inquiry as normally practiced (e.g., in the form of inter-
viewing and participant observation and paradigms such as phenomenology,
interpretivism, and ethnomethodology). How should (qualitative) psychology
respond to this?
The main argument of postqualitative scholars is that what we have come
to know as qualitative research is tied to a modernist humanism that ought to
be abandoned because it is both ethically and ontologically problematic. Just
like qualitative research as such, which is divided into many different camps
and philosophies, postqualitative research is no unified movement.
Sometimes terms such as new materialisms, new empiricisms, or posthuman-
ism are used as synonyms. Across the different designations, however, lies a
shared interest in ontology, that is, the study of what there is (Lather 2016).
As Patti Lather and Elizabeth St. Pierre, two of the most central persons in
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the postqualitative movement, put it, “rethinking humanist ontology is key in
what comes after humanist qualitative methodology” (Lather & St. Pierre
2013, p. 629). And “what there is” ontologically, according to the postquali-
tative researchers, cannot be comprehended by using mechanical models
based on Newtonian physics and the scientificity constructed on its basis.
Often, the quantum theory of Niels Bohr is invoked as providing a different
ontological ground than Newton’s mechanical physics (especially by Barad
2007). “What there is” also cannot be comprehended, according to the
postqualitative perspective, by focusing on the subjective or experiential
side of the divide that came into being historically with the dichotomy of
the objective and subjective as laid out above. Qualitative research is simply a
faulty enterprise, the argument goes, because it concerns itself with just one
side of a false dichotomy. It privileges the field of human experience and
subjectivity, but our ways of thinking of this field—and the techniques and
methods developed to study it—presupposes a metaphysics that was mis-
guided from the very beginning. As Lather and St. Pierre put it:
If we cease to privilege knowing over being; if we refuse positivist and phenom-
enological assumptions about the nature of lived experience and the world; if we
give up representational and binary logics; if we see language, the human, and the
material not as separate entities mixed together but as completely imbricated “on
the surface”—if we do all that and the “more” it will open up—will qualitative
inquiry as we know it be possible? Perhaps not. (Lather & St. Pierre 2013,
pp. 629–30)
According to these postqualitative scholars, refusing the dichotomy between
the objective (quantitative positivism) and subjective (qualitative phenomen-
ology of lived experience), which I outlined in its historical manifestation
above, means that conventional qualitative inquiry is no longer possible.
From the reflections of St. Pierre, Jackson and Mazzei (2016), we can
summarize the main philosophical ideas behind postqualitative thinking
along three lines: First, matter (or nature) is understood as agentic and always
changing. In a way, this is an ancient idea in philosophy, going back to pre-
Socratic philosophers of flux such as Heraclitus, who depicted the world as a
constant flow of becoming. We cannot step into the same river twice,
Heraclitus famously said, for the river constantly changes and the subjects
entering it are likewise in perpetual flux. Matter is not simply cold and dead, to
be studied by mechanical sciences, but a warm and vibrant process that acts
and develops. This idea was taken up much later by Nietzsche and also by John
Dewey, for example, whose pragmatism posited a “metaphysics of events,” as
articulated in Experience and Nature (Dewey 1925). Even more congenial to
the new materialism is Dewey’s Knowing and the Known (written with Arthur
Bentley in the late 1940s), which drew explicitly from Bohr’s quantum theory
(Dewey & Bentley 1949), just as Karen Barad has been doing in recent years
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(more on Dewey below). More recently, Actor-Network theorists such as John
Law and Bruno Latour have granted agency to nonhuman “actants” within
networks of practices (Latour 2005). Latour’s argument, incidentally, is similar
to the account given above about the historical emergence of “the qualitative”
together with the subjective-objective dichotomy. In his classic We Have Never
Been Modern, Latour argued that the separation of nature (of which we may
allegedly obtain objective knowledge) and society/culture/the human (for
which we need phenomenology and hermeneutics) was never possible,
although this was the backbone to the Enlightenment and the whole modern
project (Latour 1993), and that from which the notion of qualitative research
emerged. All in all, this first point deconstructs the constructed opposition
between a sphere of passive, inert matter on the one hand and a sphere of
meaningful human experiences, discourses, and actions on the other. Some
follow Haraway (1991) and talk about an “entanglement” of the material and
the semiotic—human living, thinking, and acting is always material, just as the
material is always also semiotic. The point of emphasizing the long historical
line from Heraclitus up to the contemporary scholars is not to demonstrate
that there is nothing new about the post qualitative movement, but it is, rather,
to situate what is new (notably the critique of what they call “conventional
qualitative research”) in the context of recurring philosophical ideas.
Second, as argued by St. Pierre and colleagues, there is “a heightened curiosity
and accompanying experimentation” concerning existence among post qualita-
tive researchers (St. Pierre et al. 2016, p. 102). This means that thinking in the
postqualitative movement goes on not just about “what there is” but more so
about what may become (or, to put it in more postqualitative terms, “what there
is” is just a process of becoming). As Foucault was fond of pointing out, the goal
should not be to discover who we really are, or realize our true, humanist,
authentic selves—for these are illusions—but rather to refuse who we are and
suggest alternative forms of existence (Foucault 1988). Postqualitative research
continues to some extent the playful experimentation that we have come to
associate with postmodernism and practices such as investigative poetry, arts-
based research, and creative analytical practices in general (Richardson &
St. Pierre 2005), which are also practiced within more theoretically mainstream
approaches but with more emphasis on playing with theory and philosophy.
Postqualitative work begins not with method but with (posthuman) theory.
Theorizing is seen as generative, and there is a real semantic explosion of new
words and concepts with the stated ambition of eroding the established binaries
that are seen to be inherent in qualitative research.
For example, St. Pierre works with what could be called a “flat methodol-
ogy” (my designation, not hers), which does not erect a hierarchy between
so-called data and theory. Normally in qualitative research, we grant a certain
privileged position to the empirical data, which are coded, categorized, and
analyzed using theoretical concepts, but St. Pierre puts it all on the same
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plane. Why do we only code what our informants say and not what Gilles
Deleuze or Jacques Derrida say? As Aghasaleh and St. Pierre spell out,
“knower, language, and the known are all agentive and materially and
discursively constructed” (Aghasaleh & St. Pierre 2014, p. 1). This gives us
a “flattened ontology” without a hierarchy of something (such as “empirical
data”) being more authentic or closer to reality than something else (e.g.,
philosophical theory).
Third, and following from the other points, there is a general critique and
rejection of the philosophy of representation. The “posts,” argues St. Pierre,
“announce a radical break with the humanist, modernist, imperialist, repre-
sentationalist, objectivist, rationalist, epistemological, ontological, and meth-
odological assumptions of Western Enlightenment thought and practice”
(St. Pierre 2011, p. 615). What Rorty attacked as “the mirror of nature”
some decades ago (Rorty 1980), that is, the (mistaken) idea that the human
mind is a representational device that may mirror if the proper methods are
used, a world that is independent of the mind, is completely dismantled, for
there is no detached human being (or metaphorical mirror). This might seem
to be a form of social constructionism, but that is a mistaken interpretation,
according to the posthumanists, for although social constructionists are
aligned with posthumanism concerning their shared critique of essentialism
and experientialism, social constructionism lives off the same modernist
separation of matter and meaning as conventional qualitative research and
simply focuses on the latter (or, in radical versions, claim that there is
nothing else—the material is also a social construction). Latour for one has
been very clear that he dislikes the social constructionist co-option of Actor-
Network-Theory, given that they (Latour and the constructionists) operate
with two very different ontologies. It is for this reason that social construc-
tionist approaches within psychology such as discourse and conversation
analysis are seen, from the postqualitative perspective, as belonging to the
problematic camp of “conventional qualitative research.” These approaches
study discourse and symbolic exchanges, but (in most guises) do not grant
agency to matter and thus remains within a problematic form of humanism.
The deconstruction of representationalism is also thought to lead to new
kinds of ethics in the postqualitative movement: St. Pierre, Jackson, and
Mazzei talk about how postqualitative research implies an “ethico-onto-
epistemology, which makes it clear that how we conceive the relation of
knowledge and being is a profoundly ethical issue, as is the relation between
the human and the nonhuman” (St. Pierre et al. 2016, p. 99). Further, they
say that “if humans have no separate existence, if we are completely
entangled with the world, if we are no longer masters of the universe, then
we are completely responsible to and for the world and all our relations of
becoming with it” (p. 101). However, there is little in the postqualitative
critique to help us navigate these ethical issues of responsibility, and it seems
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logically possible to draw the exact opposite conclusion: If we are no longer
masters of the universe, but simply a Deleuzian “fold” or circulating affects,
then we have absolutely no ethical responsibility because there is nothing we
can control. This discussion is likely to be significant among postqualitative
scholars in the years to come.
Following from the processual and agentic view of nature, the heightened
curiosity and experimentation, and the critique of representationalism—in
short the dismantling of what is called humanism—comes a rejection of
“humanist methodology,” that is, “the failure of the humanist subject pro-
duces the failure of humanist methodology” (St. Pierre 2011, p. 618).
St. Pierre provides a list of conventional qualitative terms that have been
deconstructed by postqualitative scholars, including interview, validity, data,
voice, and reflexivity (p. 613). These concepts are said to spring from the
notion of the bounded human subjective self that should conventionally be
called forth through interviewing, for example, giving voice to the individual
and resulting in data that should be coded and analyzed by a separate
researcher who needs to engage in a reflexive process in order to be clear
about her subjective standpoint. Something like this, in short, is what post-
qualitative researchers frame as conventional qualitative research, and this is
what they find deeply problematic.
This can be illustrated with reference to a couple of deconstructive readings
of key qualitative terms. I have already mentioned “coding,” that is, the
practice of assigning labels to bits of one’s empirical data in order to enable
a quick search in the material and an inductive aggregation of the individual
bits into general categories. Coding is conventionally taught as a necessary
technique in qualitative research (see, e.g., Gibbs 2007) For the critics, how-
ever, coding reinforces a representationalist epistemology that reduces poly-
phonic meanings to what can be captured by a single category (see Brinkmann
& Kvale 2015 on which the following is based). According to MacLure (2013),
who represents a Deleuzean approach to postqualitative research, coding
offends by positioning the analyst at arm’s length from the data. MacLure
argues that coding undermines an ethics of responsibility since “researchers
code; others get coded” (p. 168). Coding makes everything that falls within its
confines “explicable,” she says (p. 169), which, from a postqualitative view-
point, betrays the ineffable nature of reality. After having delivered a critique of
coding from a Deleuzeian viewpoint, MacLure interestingly suggests that we
can in fact retain it, albeit by understanding it in a different way, “as the
ongoing construction of a cabinet of curiosities or wunderkammer” (p. 180).
Thus, even if there are inherent ontological problems in the practice of coding
from a postqualitative perspective, it may nonetheless be a technique that can
spark wonder and creativity in the analyst.
Another term met with suspicion by postqualitative scholars is the key
qualitative notion of experience. We have already seen examples of how
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St. Pierre and colleagues reject phenomenological approaches in broad terms,
and it is notably from phenomenology that qualitative psychologists have
learned to place experience on center stage of qualitative studies. Critics of
the phenomenological studies of experience take issue with the ambition of
describing the given, which is criticized as leading to individualist and
essentialist lines of work. At the same time as phenomenologists were devel-
oping their methods in the 20th century, other philosophers had already been
attacking what they saw as “the myth of the given” (Sellars 1997), arguing
that nothing is purely and simply given, and that every understanding is
perspectival and rests on theoretical presuppositions. Furthermore, Husserl’s
original assumption that the goal of phenomenological analysis is to uncover
the essences of experiences came to sit uneasily with the anti-essentialist
stance of postmodern (and later postqualitative) thought. Derrida argued that
experience as an idea is connected to what he denounced as a metaphysics of
presence (Derrida 1970). The metaphysics of presence grounds knowledge in
what is present to a knowing subject, but, according to “post philosophers”
such as Deleuze and Derrida, this is an illusion since there are no stable
grounds or foundations from which to know the world once and for all.
St. Pierre (2008) shows how the qualitative notion of voice (which privileges
the speaking subject and her stories) belongs together with “experience” and
“narrative” to the questionable metaphysics of presence that we ought to
abandon. What the postqualitative researchers often ignore, however, is the
extent to which Derrida’s own deconstructive poststructuralism grew out of
phenomenology, owing much to Husserl’s successor Heidegger, which indi-
cates that there need not be a simple antagonism between phenomenology
and its critics.
I am aware that some “conventional qualitative researchers” (in the eyes of
the postscholars) have also questioned various forms of interviewing, for
example, and the whole idiom of “gathering data” and “coding material.”
From a discursive standpoint, Potter and Hepburn (2005) have criticized the
widespread use of interviewing in qualitative psychology, to give just one
example, and advocate analyzing naturally occurring talk whenever possible
instead. But the postqualitative critique is much more radical since it comes
from a completely different ontological starting point. This has recently been
summarized in a recent article entitled “Top ten+ lists: (Re) thinking ontol-
ogy in (post)qualitative research” by Lather (2016). From the observation
that (10) social theory has been intensely language-oriented for quite some
time, she (9) heralds the recent return to materialism “AFTER Derrida, NOT
old school Marxist materialism with its identity politics and economics in the
last instance” (p. 125). (8) She notes that post-humanist theories move away
from “the unified, conscious, and rational subject of humanism […] to the
Deleuzean subject.” (p. 125), which in general signals (7) a resistance to the
gravitational pull of humanism. (6) A different canon then gets constructed
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with Deleuze and Barad as key figures leading to (5) new postqualitative
methodologies and (4) an affect theoretical orientation concerning researcher
subjectivity. (3) This means that a new theory of change of called for, a kind
of Nietzscheanism, which (2) works by thinking through the body rather
than reflexivity as such, and the final lesson is (1) that “even something as
positivist inflected as educational policy analysis can benefit from a neo-
materialist approach” (p. 128). Lather’s impressive tour de force through new
materialist ontologies and postqualitative thinking thus ends by connecting
the new to existing discourses, signaling that the new materialisms do not so
much leave behind the old sets of assumptions as they insert them in a new
ontological framework. I will return to this below.
Ontological and advocacy issues in (post)qualitative research
After having traced the historical emergence of the idea of “the qualitative”
and the more recent postqualitative intervention, I shall introduce a different
problematic related to a distinction between ontological and advocacy issues.
I borrow this distinction from a paper by the hermeneutic philosopher
Charles Taylor, who wrote about it in the context of the liberal-
communitarian debate (Taylor 1995). This debate is not directly related to
the discussion of the qualitative and the postqualitative, although there may
be indirect links. The liberal-communitarian debate was particularly impor-
tant in political philosophy in the 1990s with leading liberals John Rawls,
Ronald Dworkin, and Thomas Nagel, among others, and significant com-
munitarian philosophers Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, and Michael
Walzer. Taylor himself has often been associated with the communitarian
camp, but the paper in question here is meant to explain why this is not
exactly in accordance with his own intentions and self-interpretation. The
debate is often framed as being between liberal individualists on the one
hand, who argue that a political system should primarily serve to protect the
rights of individuals, and communitarian collectivists on the other hand, who
argue that communities are prior to individuals, which is why the situated-
ness and duties of persons often become more important than their rights.
Taylor’s intervention in this debate was to point out that (at least) two
different discussions get run together in a problematic way. He names these
two discussions the ontological and the advocacy discussion, respectively. The
ontological discussion is between those atomists who see social life in terms of
individuals who are coming together like social atoms to form relationships
and societies on the one hand, and those, on the other hand, who see societies
as pre-existing wholes. For atomists, individuals are ontologically primary,
and, in social science, the atomists are frequently referred to as “methodolo-
gical individualists” because they argue that one can explain social life (struc-
tures and social practices) in terms of properties of the individuals that make
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up social life. Holists, on the other side, deny that this is possible and argue that
the whole is more than the sum of the parts. Communities of human beings are
prior to the individuals, and we simply cannot understand the former by
aggregating our bodies of knowledge about the latter.
The other discussion is about advocacy, that is, what we have normative
reasons to promote—the rights of the individual to determine what one
deems to be good and worthwhile (such as the individual pursuit of happi-
ness) versus shared definitions of the good life that spring from historical
traditions and communal life. Taylor believes that the two discussions con-
cerning ontology and advocacy are related, but not in a simple way: “They
are distinct, in the sense that taking a position on one doesn’t force your
hand on the other. Yet they are not completely independent, in that the stand
you take on the ontological level can be part of the essential background of
the view you advocate” (Taylor 1995, p. 182). The discussion gets confused,
however, if one sees these discussions as two sides of the same coin, and
Taylor tries to show that much of the communitarian work has been con-
cerned with social ontology (e.g., Sandel’s work on our “situated selves” that
owe their existence to communities), while much of the liberal response has
been concerned with advocacy (and the advancement of individual rights).
Actually, as Taylor argues, either stand on the ontology debate can be
combined with either stand on the advocacy debate (p. 185). One can, like
the libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick, be an atomist individualist or, like
Karl Marx, be a holist collectivist. These are the “pure” positions. But one can
also be a holist individualist like Humboldt and thereby combine a social
ontology with an individualist advocacy agenda and, like B.F. Skinner (in
Beyond Freedom and Dignity), at the same time work with an individualist
ontology and yet advocate collectivism (although Taylor finds this “night-
marish”). Taylor’s own position is aligned with Humboldt’s, that is, a com-
munitarian social ontology, seeing the self as always already socialized and
coming to existence only within communities and their “webs of interlocu-
tion” (Taylor 1989), and at the same time, advocating individual liberty and
humanist values of differences.
This position, I will argue, represents a much needed kind of humanism. It
is a humanism that recognizes the embeddedness of the individual in social
and material relations, it admits the existential “thrownness” and facticity
that Heidegger (1927) and later posthumanists (following Nietzsche) have
emphasized. It acknowledges the cultural contingency of our lives that Rorty
(1989) addressed, yet despite the many ways in which the human being is
ontologically decentered, it still affirms a certain kind of humanism. It still
finds a use for what we have come to know as qualitative research. The
remainder of this article will seek to argue that the posthuman and post-
qualitative critique often runs the two discussions together, in parallel with
what Taylor argued concerning the liberal-communitarian discussions. I will
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH IN PSYCHOLOGY 121
argue that we need the Taylorian position that combines the ontological
insights of the new materialisms with the possibility, or even stronger, the
need to defend and advocate humanism and also “conventional qualitative
research.” This, of course, will be humanism and qualitative inquiry in a new
light—one after the posts but one that understands that there is no reason to
abandon humanist ideals and values even if one accepts the postqualitative
ontology. One can (to put it in paradoxical terms) be a postqualitative
qualitative researcher and a posthumanist humanist.
Toward a humanism after posthumanism
I hope the reader senses that I have much respect for the philosophical
project behind postqualitative research. I have tried to characterize it in a
way that does justice to the richness and sophistication of its ideas. So what
could our reasons be for holding on to a form of humanism and correspond-
ing qualitative research practices now that we are after the postqualitative
critique? I will propose here a number of basic pragmatic reasons to hold on
to what Marecek (2003) has called “a qualitative stance” in psychology. This,
I will argue, can be seen as a humanist stance that recognizes the ontology of
flux—and the whole entanglement of the material and the semiotic—but
which, exactly because of this recognition, posits the need for building
more stable practices (including investigative practices) around the human.
I hope this will seem less mysterious as we proceed.
Initially, I should perhaps confess that I have become interested in the
concept of humanism in recent years mainly for political reasons. The world
is now witnessing a number of crises that transcend national and geographi-
cal borders. The economic crisis, connected to a defective neo-liberal system
that leads to poverty and increased inequality; the climate crises, giving rise
to new conflicts and struggles over scarce resources; and the refugee crisis,
spawned by wars and vexed political interests. It is clear, as Latour (1993)
pointed out years ago, that none of these crises can be understood exclusively
either in terms of “the objective” (with reference to the workings of the
natural world alone) or “the subjective” (with reference to the workings of
the social world alone). This whole modernist separation will not lead to
better understandings of the hybrid nature of our current problems.
However, if we take the latter example of the refugee crisis, it still seems to
me that we need the concept of humanism, not least for rhetorical reasons, if
we want to argue that ethical and humanitarian, and not only economic,
arguments should play a role in how to handle the problem. In my own
country, Denmark, which for decades has prided itself on being something of
a “humanitarian superpower” (in spite of its small geographical size), the
concept of humanism has very rapidly been discursively transformed from
signaling a worthy ideal to being something like a term of abuse. In public
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discussions, a humanist is now seen as someone who is irresponsible and out
of touch with reality, because “we cannot receive all the refugees in the
world.” We now have a climate of political post or even anti-humanism,
and although this is quite a different argumentative context than the philo-
sophical ideas of posthumanism discussed in this article, I believe there is a
common background: that the idea of humanism is ethically too important
for us to lose.
It is difficult to imagine an effective struggle for social justice without the
idiom of humanism. To the extent that qualitative inquiry, and the whole
qualitative stance, is connected to a democratic ethos and a social justice
agenda (Denzin & Lincoln 2011), it will likely need some kind of vocabulary
of humanism. I am aware that humanism is attacked by the postthinkers
exactly for ethical reasons. Plummer notes that “recent attacks have
denounced ‘humanism’ as a form of white, male, Western, elite domination
and colonization that is being imposed throughout the world and that brings
with it too strong a sense of the unique individual” (Plummer 2011, pp. 199–-
200). In spite of this, however, Plummer defends what he calls “a more
complex humanism” that sees human beings as “always stuffed full of their
culture and history” and as “both embodied, feeling animals and creatures
with great symbolic potential” (p. 200). This is in line with the attempt of the
present article: To see human beings as ontologically “stuffed full” of culture,
history (meaning) and corporeality and animality (matter), and yet—with
and within all this stuff—arguing that humanism is worth advocating as an
ideal. Some critics accuse humanists of “speciesism,” that is, granting rights
and dignity to humans on the basis of species membership alone. However,
that would amount to accusing ants of “Formicidaeism” (the ant equivalent
to humanism). Of course, ants cannot help but see the world from the ant
perspective. They have a special interest in their fellow ants and the flourish-
ing of their anthills, just as humans have a special interest in their fellow
humans and the flourishing of their communities. And if anti-human critics
were to object that this comparison cannot be made because there is a
difference between ants and humans related to the wider human capacity
for moral reflection and responsibility, then they would paradoxically have
confirmed the humanism that they otherwise criticize! Yes, this difference
between humans and other animals exists, and the fact that humans can be
humanists because of their special skills and capabilities does not mean that
they are not animals that live in a natural-social world that is constantly
changing. Rather, it means that this is simply part of the human condition, a
fact to be noted and acted upon and not something revered for its own sake.
John Dewey is a good source in this regard (Brinkmann 2013). For Dewey
it was axiomatic that all the things we know undergo constant change, which
is why we need a metaphysics of flux (Dewey thus discussed “flux philoso-
phers” such as Heraclitus and Bergson in positive terms). However, Dewey
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warned against sanctifying the contingent and changeable character of rea-
lity. He rejected what he called a romantic glorification of flux as “something
to revere, something profoundly akin to what is best within ourselves, will
and creative energy” (Dewey 1925, p. 51). He offered no normative valuation
of reality’s changeable nature. Instead, he regarded changeability as a meta-
physical condition that challenges humanity: “It is something to be noted and
used” (p. 71):
Man finds himself living in an aleatory world; his existence involves, to put it
baldly, a gamble. The world is a scene of risk; it is uncertain, unstable, uncannily
unstable. Its dangers are irregular, inconstant, not to be counted upon as to their
times and seasons. (Dewey 1925, p. 41)
On the one hand, Dewey cautioned against denying this basic ontological
fact, saying, “our magical safeguard against the uncertain character of the
world is to deny the existence of chance, to mumble universal and necessary
law, the ubiquity of cause and effect, the uniformity of nature, universal
progress, and the inherent rationality of the universe” (Dewey 1925, p. 44).
He thus denounced the mechanical scientific enterprise of prediction and
control. On the other hand, he also criticized the tendency to give the
uncertain character of reality normative significance. Instead, the task of
human beings is to stabilize momentarily what is unstable, to build patterns
and regularities out of chaos, because this is what makes human lives,
families, organizations, communities, and societies possible. This happens
through the development of what Dewey called social arts, through which we
may ”turn the powers of nature to account” (Dewey 1929, p. 3). To invoke a
simple example: Fire can consume the houses in which we sleep and the food
that we eat, but humans have learned to master fire and use it for their own
purposes; to keep us warm during the winter and to prepare food so that it is
more easily digested. Through such arts (at once “material” and “semiotic” to
use the contemporary idiom), we intervene in nature’s processes and seek to
stabilize and use it for our own purposes. According to Dewey’s pragmatic
perspective, we live in the world, and know it, through activity—through our
practices—and not through passive contemplation or observation. Similarly,
William James characterized pragmatism as not just a theory about knowl-
edge (an epistemology) but also as a theory about the universe as such. James
said of pragmatism: “On the pragmatist side we have only one edition of the
universe, unfinished, growing in all sorts of places, especially in the places
where thinking beings are at work” (James 1981/1907, p. 116). Reality comes
in one edition (not two such as a material and a semiotic) and is unfinished,
just as the proponents of new ontologies argue, but it is up to humans to give
it some stability and form through the development of social practices and
arts (Dewey 1929, p. 40).
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Although the pragmatic humanism advocated here agrees ontologically
with the flux thinkers, it stands opposed to their normative valuation of the
unstable, for example, as articulated by St. Pierre who writes: “My desire is
for post inquiry to remain unstable as we create different articulations,
assemblages, becomings, mash-ups of inquiry given the entanglement that
emerges in our different projects” (St. Pierre 2011, p. 623). In contrast,
Dewey argued that “the striving to make stability of meaning prevail over
the instability of events is the main task of intelligent human effort” (Dewey
1925, p. 50). According to Dewey, this is the proper response to the realiza-
tion of the world’s uncertain, eventful, unfinished, and dangerous character,
as rightly formulated by the new ontologists. We must develop social prac-
tices through which we can master reality in the best ways possible in order
to advance human values. This holds for science (the most obvious “stabiliz-
ing practice” in modern society) as well as for ethics and politics. These are
all elements of our practical reason, the type of reason that involves acting
well. For Dewey and pragmatism in general, practical reason provides the
pattern for all reason (Garrison 1999). Ontologically, Dewey would thus
agree with the posthumanists, but in terms of advocacy he would side with
the humanists.
Marx and Engels famously wrote in The Communist Manifesto that “all
that is solid melts into air” because of the “constant revolutionizing of
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting
uncertainty and agitation [that] distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all
earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones
become antiquated before they can ossify” (Marx & Engels 1848). The
destabilizing tendencies of the capitalist system have only increased since
the middle of the 19th century, most recently with the epoch variously
named late capitalism, postmodernity, or liquid modernity, which advances
a kind of network capitalism (Brinkmann 2008). The notion of the network
(Latour) or the rhizome (Deleuze) figure prominently in the new materialist
ontologies. Various researchers, however, are now problematizing the ideo-
logical effects of this discursive formation. From the perspective of critical
theory, Hartmann and Honneth have argued that “to the extent that the
image of a society pervaded by networks takes hold as a fundamental means
of societal self-description, other images of the social whole lose in influence”
(Hartmann & Honneth 2006, p. 52). French pragmatists Boltanski and
Chiapello (2005) have concluded that the notion of network both as an
organizational and institutional mechanism and as an ideology has become
central in postmodernity, characterized by neo-liberal flexibilization. They
argue that the institutionalization and ontologization of networks has few
chances of leading to social justice, because networks do not consider those
who find themselves ‘disconnected’ or on its margins. One is either part of
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the networks and must function according to their (capitalist) logics, or one
is outside the networks and consequently socially impotent. In their analysis
of “network capitalism,” Hartmann and Honneth agree with this diagnosis:
“In network capitalism, on this thesis, citizens tend to perceive their efforts,
successes, and failures as individualized, so that a reference to the greater
whole scarcely seems possible any longer” (2006, p. 52). In his book on
Deleuze, Slavoj Žižek has gone so far as to directly criticize Deleuze—this
key posthuman thinker and arguably the most important source of inspira-
tion for the post qualitative scholars—for being “the ideologist of late capit-
alism.” It is worth quoting Žižek at some length in order to understand this
harsh verdict:
There are, effectively, features that justify calling Deleuze the ideologist of late
capitalism. Is the much celebrated Spinozan imitation affecti, the impersonal
circulation of affects bypassing persons, not the very logic of publicity, of video
clips, and so forth in which what matters is not the message about the product but
the intensity of the transmitted affects and perceptions? […] Is this logic in which
we are no longer dealing with persons interacting but just with the multiplicity of
intensities, of places of enjoyment, plus bodies as a collective/impersonal desiring
machine not eminently Deleuzian? (Žižek 2012, pp. 163–4)
This analysis of Deleuze in effect claims that his rhizomatic network ontology
mirrors and facilitates the ideology of late capitalism. As I see it, advocating
humanism, and the whole qualitative interest in human lives and experi-
ences, is needed to counteract this ideology. Transforming an ontological
realization of flux into an advocacy for instability and the impersonal circu-
lation of affect may simply come to serve some of the most problematic
tendencies of our times – and contribute to melting the few remaining solids
into air.
Conclusions
The acting and experiencing human being is not an ahistorical, disembodied,
and universal intellect but rather a historical, embodied, affective creature that
lives in a world of flux and uncertainty. Yet within that world, humans have
managed historically to build relatively stable structures and routines together
that make possible their experiencing and acting. Certainly, many of these
structures and routines have been oppressive for various groups of people, but
simply advocating for destabilizing structures and routines as such—no matter
what we talk about—seems to be a risky strategy for ethical and political reasons.
If the pragmatists are right, then we should think of stabilizing practices,
including our scientific techniques and arts, as providing the precondition for
ethical human life. Some of the stabilizing practices have been qualitative
research practices, which study persons’ ways of experiencing and acting in
their many forms. Taking what Marecek (2003) calls a “qualitative stance”
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toward human life means studying phenomena in a context of history, society,
and culture; it means resituating humans in their life worlds; and it means
approaching humans as reflexive and intentional agents who can create meaning
and hence stability. As I have argued, this represents a form of humanism that is
worth holding on to. In this article, I have argued that we can and must accept
much of the ontological theorizing conducted under the postqualitative and
posthumanist banners. In fact, some qualitative methodologists within the
camps of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (e.g., Kendall & Wickham 1999),
Participatory Action Research (e.g., Weis & Fine 2004), and Critical Realism
(e.g., Maxwell 2012) already do this by working with a parallel awareness of
meanings and materiality (future discussions should clarify the relationship
between these various philosophies of qualitative research). But we should not
transform ontology into advocacy or ideology. Instead, we should see the
precarious and unstable nature of reality as giving rise to an ethical demand
for humans, namely, to enact relatively stable practices in which it becomes
possible to conduct flourishing lives together. Qualitative research is very
important as a set of investigative practices in this regard in our liquid modern
world. From the point of view of this humanism after posthumanism, humanity
is not an a priori given, but represents ideals to be realized in our social practices,
and this may become possible by advocating the humanist values in some form.
Working on the basis of qualitative research can augment this project, which I
believe is too valuable to be thrown out with the postqualitative bathwater.
As I tried to show in the account of the history of “the qualitative,”
qualitative inquiry need not be tied to the questionable modernist divide
between “the natural” and “the social,” since qualitative studies were first and
foremost found in the natural sciences. I believe the task now should not be
for all of us to become “postqualitative” but rather to reinterpret our quali-
tative practices such as coding and interviewing—and key concepts such as
experience and subjectivity—after the postqualitative critique. Taking the
distinction between ontology and advocacy into account could be a signifi-
cant step in this regard. We should thank the postqualitative scholars for
highlighting the potential ideological effects of what we have come to think
of as qualitative research, but we should try to make sure that the post
qualitative intervention does not itself become aligned with late capitalist
ideology of destabilization that renders important ethical values and ideals
impossible to enact.
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